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Articles

Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing:
Crawford v. Washington, a Reassessment of the
Confrontation Clause
Honorable Paul W. Grimml & Professor Jerome E. Deise, Jr. 2
During the 2004 legislative session, the Governor of Maryland
introduced two bills designed to address the issue of witness
intimidation in criminal cases. The bills, Senate Bill 185 and House
Bill 296, contained numerous measures aimed at combating the
problem of witness intimidation. Among the provisions was a
proposal to add to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland a "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception
to the hearsay rule, patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6),
which has been in existence for more than twenty years. Neither bill
was enacted into law. Legislators interviewed by the press during the
legislative session expressed concern about the proposed hearsay
exception, specifically citing the Supreme Court's March 8, 2004
decision in Crawford v. Washington 3 as evidence that the Governor's
proposal was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment
I
Judge Grimm serves as a full time Magistrate Judge for the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland. He additionally serves as an adjunct faculty
member at the University of Maryland School of Law, where he teaches Trial
Evidence, Pretrial Civil Litigation and Scientific Evidence Seminar. In 2002, he was
the recipient of that school's Outstanding Adjunct Professor of the Year award.
Judge Grimm is a frequent lecturer at CLE programs on issues regarding evidence
and civil procedure, and has published extensively on these topics. Judge Grimm is
a 2004 recipient of The Daily Record's Leadership in Law Award. He is an
alumnus of the University of New Mexico School of Law.
2
Professor Deise teaches Evidence, Criminal Law, Comparative Professional
Responsibility, Trial Evidence, Trial Advocacy, and Advanced Trial Advocacy at the
University of Maryland School of Law. He also coaches that school's nationally
ranked and highly regarded national trial team. In 2004, he was the recipient of the
prestigious Richard S. Jacobsen Award for Excellence in Teaching Trial Advocacy, a
national award given annually to an outstanding law professor "who exemplifies the
best attributes of the trial lawyer as teacher, mentor and advocate." In 1998, he
received the University of Maryland School of Law's Outstanding Teacher of the
Year award. Professor Deise is also an esteemed alumnus of the University of
Baltimore School of Law.
3 Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
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Confrontation Clause. 4 In fact, Crawford does not directly address the
constitutionality of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception;
in dicta, the Court clearly expressed its approval of this Rule.
This article first examines the Crawford decision, then the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, and
demonstrates that the proposed exception is not constitutionally
infirm.
Michael Crawford allegedly stabbed Kenneth Lee after
learning that Lee tried to rape Crawford's wife. In a recorded
statement to police, Crawford's wife, Sylvia, said that Lee did not
draw a weapon before Crawford stabbed him. The State intended to
use Sylvia's statement to controvert Crawford's claim of self-defense.
At trial, Sylvia invoked the marital privilege, and was, therefore,
"unavailable" to testify for the State against her husband. Under
Washington law, the marital privilege does not extend to a spouse's
out-of-court statement that is otherwise admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule. s The State, therefore, sought to
introduce Sylvia's statement as admissible hearsay.
The State argued that, by invoking the state marital privilege,
which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other
spouse's consent, Sylvia was an "unavailable" witness, under the
Washington evidence rule equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a)(1). Further, noting that Sylvia admitted leading Crawford to
Lee's apartment, thereby facilitating the assault, the State contended
that her statement qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule as a
statement against penal interest, under the Washington evidence rule
equivalent of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b )(3). The prosecutor played the tape
of Sylvia's statement to the jury during Crawford's trial for assault
and attempted murder, and, in closing, argued that the tape was
"damning evidence that completely refute[d] [Crawford's] claim of
self-defense."6 Sylvia'S tape-recorded statement was offered against
Kimberly A.c. Wilson, Ehrlich Urges Panel to Give 2nd Chance to Criminal
Justice Bill Legislators Killed, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 10, 2004 at Local 5B.
The story reports Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., chairman of the house committee
that considered HB 296, as saying, "Clearly, if that bill had gone to the floor that
way [containing the proposed hearsay exception], it would have been deemed
unconstitutional [under CrawfordJ."
5 WASH. REv. CODE §5.60.060 (West, WESTLA W through 2004 legislation).
6 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
4
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Crawford without affording him the opportunity to confront or crossexamine her, and the jury subsequently convicted Crawford of first
degree assault.
The crucial issue presented was whether this procedure
complied with the Sixth Amendment guarantee that, "in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."7 Crawford presented the Court with
an old dilemma. On the one hand, the Government has a legitimate
interest in prosecuting criminal defendants, and therefore, should be
allowed to offer relevant and otherwise admissible evidence to prove
a defendant's guilt. On the other hand, the Constitution provides
rights to the accused in criminal proceedings and bars the
admissibility of certain evidence violative of those rights, even though
the evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.
Crawford also raises a host of intriguing questions. These are
but a few: What does the phrase, "witnesses against him," as
provided in the Sixth Amendment, actually mean? When is a
statement a "testimonial" statement and when is it "non-testimonial?"
Which statements implicate the Confrontation Clause? Are certain
hearsay statements beyond the scope of the Confrontation Clause?
Do the Constitutional rights of an accused "trump" (if that is an
appropriate metaphor) the rules of evidence? Do the rules of
evidence ever "trump" the Constitutional rights of an accused, or
does neither "trump" the other? Under what circumstances must the
defendant have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine a now
"unavailable" hearsay declarant before those statements can be
admitted? Can a criminal defendant, by his conduct, "waive" or
"forfeit" an objection to the admissibility of certain hearsay
statements? Can he "waive" or "forfeit" his right to Confrontation?
No doubt, in the fullness of time, scholars and judges will
answer many of these questions, or die trying. There are already
available excellent analyses of Crawford by various legal scholars;8
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Fitzpatrick, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,
Little Brown & Co. (database updated July 2004, Chapter 8 Hearsay, §398.l
Testimonial and Nontestimonial Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause); George
Fisher, EVIDENCE, Foundation Press, 2002 (2004 Replacement to text pages 521-50);
Jon R. Waltz & Roger Park, EVIDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS, 10th ed. (June 2004
Update Memo); Daniel J. Capra, Dennis D. Prater, Stephen A. Salzburg & Christine
7

8
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therefore, any further attempt by us to do so is unnecessary. Rather,
for our comprehension and appreciation of the broader and finer
points of Crawford, we go to the "horse's mouth," so to speak. For our
understanding of Crawford, we rely principally upon the comments,
thoughts, and observations of Jeffrey L. Fisher, lead counsel for
Michael D. Crawford in the United States Supreme Court. 9
The article begins, in Part I, with an historical review of the
Confrontation Clause. In Part II, we discuss Crawford's impact on the
Confrontation Clause. Finally, in Part III, we argue that, in light of
Crawford, Maryland should adopt Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), which
provides that statements made by witnesses that are unavailable to
testify at trial because of threat, intimidation, chicanery, or
elimination by the defendant or his agents are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule.lO
Although the facts in Crawford did not involve forfeiture by
wrongdoing, the Court, in passing, made clear that when a criminal
defendant wrongfully prevents witnesses from testifying, his conduct
"extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds."ll We discuss "forfeiture by wrongdoing" more fully in
M. Arguello, EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD, 2d ed. LexisNexis, (2004 Letter
Update; Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna Raeder & David Crump, EVIDENCE: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 2d ed., Mathew Bender (note by Prof. Rothstein, 2004
Letter Update).
9
The authors wish to thank Jeffrey L. Fisher, Attorney at Davis Wright Tremaine
LLP, Seattle, WA, for his kindness and generosity in allowing us to draw upon the
outline notes of his lecture, entitled Crawford v. Washington: Reframing The Right
To Confrontation. This outline incorporates post-Crawford decisions through
August 3, 2004. We owe an additional debt of gratitude to Professor Lynn McLain
of the University of Baltimore School of Law for her thoughtful suggestions.
10 Fed. R. Evid. 802.
II Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 15859 (1879»; see also United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir. 2001)
("threats, actual violence, or murder" forfeit confrontation rights); People v. Moore,
2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1354, (declarant's death at the hands of the defendant was a
"forfeiture of the constitutional right of confrontation with respect to a witness or
potential witness whose absence the defendant wrongfully procures). Id. at 10; see
post-Crawford cases: State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609 (2004) (Defendant'S right of
confrontation forfeited because he killed the declarant). Id. at 793-94. (The Court
cited Crawford as support for the extinction of a confrontation claim. Statement by
witness was admitted under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-460(d)(3). That statutory
exception requires (1) that the declarant be unavailable, (2) that the statement was
made at a time when the declarant recently perceived the matter, while declarant's
recollection was clear, and (3) that the statement was made in good faith prior to the
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sections II and III. As will be seen, not all hearsay statements are
excluded by the Confrontation Clause where a defendant does not
have a prior opportunity to cross-examine.

I.

Crawford v. Washington: An Historical Overview
Crawford provides an interesting glimpse of the Court's

approach to Constitutional interpretation. It begins by looking to the
language of the Constitution - in this case, the Sixth Amendment.
When the Constitution's text alone is inadequate to resolve a
particular issue, the Court turns to the history of the Confrontation
Clause. 12 While the right to confront one's accusers can be traced to
Roman times, the founding generation's immediate source was
common law.13 English common law differs from the civil law
tradition in the manner in which witnesses provide testimony in
criminal trials. The former is a tradition of live testimony, while the
latter condones examination in private by judicial officers.14
England adopted some elements of civil law practice,
including the practice of admitting ex parte statements of accusers
against the accused at trial. This practice occasioned frequent
demands by the prisoner to have his accusers' brought before him
face to face. illS During the 16th Century reign of Queen Mary, justices
II

I

commencement of the action and with no incentive to falsify or distort). Jd. at 613.
(The Court decided on the grounds of "forfeiture by wrongdoing," and declined to
assess whether the statement was testimonial or not). Jd. at 614; State v. Fields, 679
N.W. 2d 341 (Minn. 2004) (In its analysis of Crawford as applied in the case at bar,
the Court held that the defendant's right to confrontation was not violated, as he
forfeited that right by his wrongdoing). Jd. at 346-47. (The Court also noted that
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) "probably amounts as well to a forfeiture of an objection
based on the right of confrontation" and that the Minnesota Rules of Evidence do not
include such a rule). Jd. at 347 n.2.
12
The Court's opinion provides a detailed and informative discussion of the
historical development of the right to confrontation; it is, therefore, unnecessary, for
the purposes of this article, to repeat it here. We have included only those historical
facts needed to aid in our discussion.
13 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See Coy v. Jona, 457 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988);
Herman & Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the
Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. 1. INT'LL. 481 (1994)).
14 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See 3 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 373-74 (1768)).
15
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-60 (citing 1 James F. Stephen, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (London, MacMillan 1883)).
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of the peace were appointed, under the Marian bail and committal
statutes, to examine suspects and witnesses in felony cases and certify
the results to the court. While it is unlikely the original purpose of
these examinations was to produce evidence admissible at trial, 16 they
were used this way in subsequent cases, thereby adopting the
continental, civil law procedureY
Perhaps the most notorious example of this practice was the
1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Raleigh was charged with treason.
Damning evidence against him consisted of a letter and a statement,
obtained by the Privy Council, of Raleigh's alleged accomplice, Lord
Cobham, which was read to the jury over Raleigh's objections.
Raleigh believed Cobham made the statement to save his own life and
that he would recant if he was required to face Raleigh at trial.
Raleigh, protesting that he was being tried "by the Spanish
Inquisition,"IS demanded that the judges call Cobham to appear.
Raleigh argued, unsuccessfully, that "the Proof of the Common Law
is by witness and jury: Let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my
accuser before my face."19 Cobham did not appear at trial, however,
and Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.
Following considerable dissatisfaction with the process used
to convict Raleigh, English law, through a series of statutory and
judicial reforms, developed a right of confrontation to limit such
abuses in certain cases, such as treason. Courts developed relatively
strict rules of unavailability, admitting ex parte examinations only
when the witness was demonstrably unable to testify in person. 20
Throughout this period, a "recurring question was whether
the admissibility of an unavailable witness's pretrial examination
depended on whether the defendant had had an opportunity to crossexamine him."21 This question was answered in the affirmative in
1696 by the Court of the King's Bench, which ruled that the statement
16 Id.
(See John H. Langrein, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 21-34
(Harvard Univ. Press 1974)).
17 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-60 (See M. Hale, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 284 (1736);
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 528-30 (3d ed. 1944)).
18 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See Raleigh's Case, 2 How. ST. TR. 15-16 (H.L.
1603)).
19
Id.
20 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (See Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. ST. TR. 769-71
(H.L. 1666)).
21 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360.
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of a deceased witness was inadmissible "where 'the defendant not
being present when [it was] taken before the mayor ... had lost the
benefit of cross-examination.fJJ22
Following the Crawford Court's discussion of the development
of the right to confrontation in England, the Court turned its attention
to the colonies, where similar practices were employed. 23 "Early in
the 18th Century, the Virginia Council protested against the Governor
for having 'privately issued several commissions to examine
witnesses against particular men ex parte,' complaining that 'the
person accused is not admitted to be confronted with, or defend
against his defamers."'24 The Court also noted that, prior to the
American Revolution, England allocated jurisdiction over Stamp Act
offenses to the admiralty courts, which followed civil law, and thus
regularly took testimony by deposition or private judicial
examination. 25
"Many declarations of rights adopted around the time of the
Revolution guaranteed a right of confrontation."26 While the proposed
Federal Constitution did not, the First Congress, responding to
objections to its exclusion, included the Confrontation Clause in what
became the Sixth Amendment,27 While all states adopted the
Confrontation Clause, some went so far as to hold out-of-court
statements inadmissible even where the accused had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant,28 Many states rejected
this view, but only after reaffirming that admissibility depended on
the prior opportunity of the accused to cross-examine. 29

Id. at 1360-61 (quoting King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 165,87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585
(1896».
23 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1362.
24
Id. (quoting A MEMORIAL CONCERNING THE MAL-ADMINISTRATION OF HIS
EXCELLENCY FRANCIS NICHOLSON, reprinted in 9 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS
253,257 (D. Douglas ed. 1955».
25 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1362.
26
Id. See MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RiGHTS, Article 21 (1867), providing,
inter alia, right to confrontation and examination of witnesses under oath to citizens
of Maryland.
27 Id. at 1362-63.
28
Id. at 1363.
29
Id.
22
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II.

Crawford and the Right to Confrontation

Crawford argued that, state law notwithstanding, the
admission of Sylvia's tape-recorded statement violated his federal
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 3D
Applying the then-current standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts,31 the
Washington trial court held that the Confrontation Clause does not
bar the statement of an unavailable witness (such as Sylvia) against a
criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate indicia of
reliability."32 To meet that standard, evidence must either fall within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception," or "bear particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."33 The trial court admitted the statement on the latter
ground, offering as proof of the statement's trustworthiness that
Sylvia was not shifting blame to Crawford, but rather corroborating
his story that he acted in self-defense or "justified reprisal."34 The trial
court found persuasive that Sylvia had direct knowledge as an
eyewitness, that she was describing recent events, and that a
"neutral" law enforcement officer questioned her. 35
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, applying a ninefactor test to determine if Sylvia's statement bore particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. In concluding that it did not, the court
offered several reasons: The statement contradicted one she had
previously given; it was made in response to specific questions; and,
at one point, Sylvia admitted that she closed her eyes during the
stabbing. 36 The court considered and rejected the State's argument
that Sylvia's statement was reliable because it coincided with
Crawford's to such a degree that the two "interlocked."37 Although
the two statements were consistent in their accounts of events leading
up to the stabbing, they differed on the crucial issue of self-defense.

30

I d.

31

448 U.S. 56 (1980).

32 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (1980)) (Emphasis
added).
33 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 (Emphasis added).
34 I d.
35Id. at 1358.
36Id.
37Id. at 1355.
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"[Crawford's] version assert[ed] that Lee may have had something in
his hand when Crawford stabbed him; but Sylvia's version [had] Lee
grabbing for something only after he [had] been stabbed."38
The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction,
unanimously concluding that, although Sylvia's statement did not fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of
trustworthiness. The court found that "when a co-defendant's
confession is virtually identical [ i.e., interlocks] to that of a defendant,
it may be deemed reliable."39
This procedural history reflects both the Supreme Court's
struggle to resolve the controversy and the inadequacies of the Roberts
two-pronged standard. The failings of Roberts were indeed "on full
display in the proceedings below."40 As Professor George Fisher
points out:
[T]he Court's many attempts to
reconcile the hearsay exception with the
Confrontation Clause's command have
been halting and nonlinear . . . . In the
pre-Roberts era, beginning with Mattox v.
United States, the Court issued a number
of ad hoc judgments to resolve particular
controversies, but made little attempt to
systematize the Confrontation Clause's
impact on the admission of hearsay. The
Court first undertook this task in earnest
in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

Id. at 1358.
Crawford v. State of Washington, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (2002) (The Court, quoting
State of Washington v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427 (1993), explained: "Although the
Court of Appeals concluded that the statements were contradictory, upon closer
inspection they appear to overlap .... [B]oth of the Crawfords' statements indicate
that Lee was possibly grabbing for a weapon, but they are equally unsure when this
event may have taken place. They are also equally unsure how Michael received the
cut on his hand, leading the Court to question when, if ever, Lee possessed a weapon.
In this respect they overlap . . .. [N]either Michael nor Sylvia clearly stated that
Lee had a weapon in hand from which Michael was simply defending himself. And
it is this omission by both that interlocks the statements and makes Sylvia's
statement reliable." Id. at 664. (Internal quotation marks omitted).
40 Crawford, 124 S. Ct at 1372.
38

39
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There the Court launched an ultimately
aborted
attempt
to
crystallize
Confrontation doctrine around the
familiar hearsay principles of necessity
and reliability. Early in 2004, after
tinkering with the Roberts framework for
nearly a quarter-century, the Court
finally abandoned the task. In Crawford
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), it
set Confrontation on an entirely new
footing, focused on the "testimonial"
nature of the out-of-court statement.
After Crawford, it seems, Roberts and its
reliability-based analysis are dead. 41
The Supreme Court drew two inferences from its exhaustive
historical analysis about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. "First,
the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused."42 The English
Crown employed "these practices in notorious treason cases like
Raleigh's; that the Marian statutes invited; that English law's assertion
of a right of confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the
founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be
interpreted with this focus in mind."43
Second, the Court determined that "the Framers would not
have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who
did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."44 As
will be seen, neither of these two evils are implicated by the
George Fisher, EVIDENCE, Supplement, at p.l, Foundation Press, 2004 (discussing
the Pre-Roberts Era Cases: Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); and the Roberts
Era Cases: Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (rules of "necessity" and
"reliability"); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346 (1992); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999».
42 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363.
43 Id.
44 /d. at 1365.

41

14

Constitution or the hearsay exception provided by Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(6). So then, when does the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation apply?
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies only in a
criminal case and only when the prosecutor offers a hearsay statement
against the accused. If the declarant testifies in court and is, therefore,
subject to cross-examination, the right is not violated. If the accused
had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant previously, the
right is not violated. If the statement offered is the declarant's, it is
not hearsay if it is offered as a prior statement, under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1), or as an admission of a party-opponent, under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2); therefore, the right is not violated.
Under Maryland Rule 5-802(1), certain prior statements by
witnesses are not excluded by the hearsay rule. Nor are statements,
otherwise admissible, made by the accused when offered by the State,
under Md. Rule 5-803(a) as a statement by a party-opponent.
Furthermore, under Md. Rule 5-803(a), statements of a partyopponent are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
defendant is available as a witness. If a statement is not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay and the right is
not violated. If the statement is offered for its truth, the prosecutor
must offer an appropriate exception; if she cannot, the hearsay
statement is excluded and the right is not violated. It is only when a
statement is offered for its truth and falls within an exception that we
consider the statement's effect on the Confrontation Clause. If the
statement is "testimonial," then we tum to Crawford to determine
whether it violates the Confrontation Clause, even though it may be
admissible under the rules of evidence. If the statement is not
testimonial, then it appears that, despite Justice Scalia's severe
criticism of Roberts's reliance upon such an "amorphous" concept as
reliability, its unpredictability, and its "unpardonable vice" (i.e., its
capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation
Clause clearly meant to exclude),45 states may continue to rely upon
the Roberts standard.

45

Id. at 1371.
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When Is a Statement a "Testimonial?"
While it is clear that Crawford applies to "testimonial"
statements, it is not entirely clear what that term means. In a
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
O'Connor, severely criticized the majority opinion for both its
linguistic ambiguity and its difficult implementation for judges and
lawyers alike. 46 The Court opted to "leave for another day any effort
to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial;'" nevertheless,
there is language in the opinion from which we may attempt to glean
its meaning. 47 According to the Court, "testimonial" statements
include:

Ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent - that is, material
such
as
affidavits,
custodial
examinations, prior testimony . . . or
similar
pretrial
statements
that
declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially. . . [, and]
[e ]xtrajudicial statements ... contained
in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions. 48
The Court described these as "core" testimonial statements,
but suggested that this list was not exhaustive. 49 As Jeffrey 1. Fisher,
lead counsel for Michael Crawford in his case before the Supreme
Court, points out, "the confrontation right does not apply only to
abuses at the time of the Founding; it also applies to modern types of
statements that the Framers would have barred."so
Id. at 1374-78.
Id.atI374.
48 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364 (Internal citations omitted).
49 Fisher notes (p. 3) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364).
50 Fisher notes (p. 3) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.3). (In addition, Fisher
suggests several "clues" within the Court's jurisprudence that might provide
meaning to the term. For example: "An accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
46

47
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Whatever else the term covers, it applies
at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial [] and to police
interrogations, 51 • • • [] allocutions, guilty
pleas, and other formal statements
admitting guilt52 • • • • [In addition,]
"letters" to police or other governmental
of
officials
accusing
someone
53
wrongdoing are testimonial.
•
•
Coroner reports, drug chemist reports,
etc. [] should be testimonial because
they are statements made for the
purpose of producing evidence for
litigation. 54 • • • [S]tatements of elderly or
dependent adult victims to law

remark to an acquaintance does not. . . . Involvement of government officers in the
production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents a unique potential for
prosecutorial abuse .... Sylvia's recorded statement, knowingly given in response to
structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition . . . .
[Wi hen the government is involved in the statements' production and when the
statements describe past events . .. [the statements] implicate the core concerns of
the old ex parte affidavit practice .... [A]n out-ofcourt accusation is universally
conceded to be constitutionally inadmissible against the accused." While this
definition would seem to include excited utterances, opinions differ about whether
such statements are, or should be, included. Fisher's "clues", however, are more
problematic and several are likely to be the subject of considerable debate.}.
51
Fisher notes (p. 3) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374) ("We use the term
'interrogation' in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense. . . .
'[S]tructured police questioning' qualifies as an interrogation 'under any conceivable
definition."') (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4).
52 Fisher notes (p. 3) ("These are testimonial. See 124 S. Ct. at 1372, abrogating
United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-23 (9th Cir. 2003), and similar
holdings in other circuits allowing admission of allocutions. See also Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 53 (1 899)(guilty pleas); United States v. Massino, 319 F.
Supp. 2d 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (guilty pleas)"}.
53 Fisher notes (p. 4) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct at 1360) (noting that an accusatory
"letter" was used against Sir Walter Raleigh).
54 Fisher notes (p. 4) (See City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591 (Nev. 2004)
(nurse's chain-of-custody affidavit concerning method of conducting and preserving
blood alcohol test is testimonial); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 393 (2004)
(report of blood test is testimonial). Immigration reports may be testimonial for the
same reasons. (Fisher notes pA).
17

enforcement officials
are by
definition testimonial,55.
[as are]
[d]omestic violence accusations,56....
Fisher, taking a decidedly pro-defense spin, argues that the
following statements are "testimonial"; however, others would
disagree, urging that their status as "testimonial statements" is by no
means clear nor have they been universally accepted as such by the
courts:
[c]hild hearsay statementsp... [w ]itness
statements to officers investigating a
Fisher notes (p. 4) (citing People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004)} (holding that a California law was invalid on its face).
56 Fisher notes (p. 4) (stating, "These are testimonial almost by definition, for they
condition admissibility on the statement accusing someone of criminal behavior;
being made within 24 hours of alleged event; and being . . .'recorded, either
electronically or in writing' or 'made to a peace officer ... corrections officer, youth
corrections officer, parole [or] probation officer, emergency medical technician or
firefighter.') (See also People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. App. 2004) (wife's
statements in a protection order testimonial.)"}.
57 Fisher notes (p. 4-5) (stating, "When a child makes an accusation of abuse to a
governmental agent in an interview, the statements are testimonial, in that they are
given in a formalized setting as part of a criminal investigation, and a reasonable
person would know that the statements would likely be used for evidentiary
purposes. See Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. App. 2004) (holding that
statements obtained under Maryland's child interview statute are testimonial); See
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (child's statement to
child interview specialist at private victim assessment center was testimonial); State
v. Courtney, 682 N.W. 2d 185 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (interview with child
protective services worker testimonial); Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (child's statement to police investigator testimonial); People v. Vigil,
2004 WL 1352647 (Colo. App. June 17, 2004) (child's statements to police officer
and to a physician who was a member of a child protection team and a frequent
prosecution witness in child abuse cases were testimonial, but prior statements to
father and father's friend were not.). It is worth noting that the child's statements in
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), were given to a doctor in conjunction with the
police's investigation; the Court suggested these statements were testimonial at oral
argument in Crawford and arguably by its silence in the section of the opinion
canvassing its prior holdings. See 124 S. Ct. at 1367-68 ('Our case law has largely
been consistent with these two principles. '). If statements are given to a nongovernmental addressee before the police are involved and before litigation is
contemplated, the question gets harder. See 124 S. Ct 1368 n.8 (stating that the
child's statements to the police officer in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 326 (1992), were
testimonial but not mentioning the child's statements to parent and others)"}.
55
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crime/ 58 ••• 911 calls/ 59. • • [s ]tatements to
private investigators or to private
58 Fisher notes (p. 5-6) (stating, "Since these statements generally are given for
evidentiary purposes, they ordinarily are testimonial. See [Crawford,] 124 S. Ct. [at]
1368 n.8 (statement in White v Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), 'to an investigating
police officer' was testimonial) ... (defining police 'interrogation'). It does not
matter whether the statements are reproduced in police reports that ordinarily would
satisfy 'business records' or any other hearsay exception .... The United States
Solicitor General, in fact, has agreed that 'statements made to officers at the scene by
a disinterested bystander who directly observed the commission of a crime and
promptly reported it to the police' are testimonial. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Crawford at 26. Early court decisions, however, [are] divided on
this issue. [Cf] United States v. Neilsen, 371 F.3d 574 (9th Cir. 2004) (statement to
an officer during execution of search warrant testimonial); Bell v. State, 597 S.E.2d
350 (Ga. 2004) (alleged victim's statement to police officers 'during the officers'
investigations of complaints made by the victim' testimonial); Heard v.
Commonwealth, 2004 WL 1367163 (Ky. App. June 18, 2004) (unpublished)
(agitated victim's statements to responding police officer were testimonial even
though they qualified as excited utterances); and People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d
753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (alleged victim statement to investigating officer
testimonial); State v. Clark, 598 S.E.2d 213 (N.c. Ct. App. 2004) (statement made
to officer 'during his initial investigation' at the scene of crime is testimonial) with
Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, n. 22 (9th Cir. 2004) (alleged victim statement to
officer responding to 911 call not testimonial); State v. Fowler, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]hen police arrive at the scene of an incident in response to a
request for assistance and begin informally questioning those nearby immediately
thereafter in order to determine what has happened, statements given in response
thereto are not 'testimoniaL"'); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (same); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.c. Ct. App. 2004) (holding, over a
dissent, that such a statement not testimonial because given right after event) and
Cassidy v. Texas, 2004 WL 1114483 (Tex. App. May 20, 2004) (alleged victim's
statement in police interview right after event not testimonial). For a very good
discussion of this issue in an article prior to the Roberts era that advocated a rule
similar to the testimonial approach, see Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation
Clause, the Hearsay Rule and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REv. 151, 194-95
(1978) (distinguishing nontestimonial spontaneous declaration to robber in midst of
robbery from a testimonial spontaneous declaration to a police officer immediately
after robbery)").
59 Fisher notes (p. 6) (stating, "A call to report a crime (especially when followed
by questions and answers with an operator) is testimonial, but a call solely for help
may not be. See Friedman & McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 PA. L. REv.
1171, 1240-42 (2002). But even in the latter situation, statements made in a call in
the heat of the moment that say more than 'come help me' should still be considered
testimonial. Id.; People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2004) (holding that 911 call
was testimonial) but see People v. Muscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (2004) (suggesting that
all 911calls that include requests for help are nontestimonial in their entirety). If
statements in a 911 call explicitly accuse a particular person of wrongdoing, it may
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victim's services organizations,60. . .
[s]tatements to doctors,61 ... [s ]tatements
to undercover agents or informants62 [,
and] [d]ying declarations.63
also be worth citing the 'accusatory' language ... to bolster the argument. A case
involving a 911 call is currently pending in the Washington Supreme Court and is set
for oral argument .... See State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661 (2003), review granted, 75
P.3d 969 (2003) (supplemental briefing ordered in light of Crawford)").
60 Fisher notes (p. 6) (stating, "If the setting was like an interview in that a
reasonable witness would have expected his statements to be used for evidentiary
purposes, then it seems testimonial even without governmental involvement. See
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (child's statement to
child interview specialist at private victim assessment center was testimonial);
Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L. REv. 1011
,1038-43 (1998); but see People v. Geno, 261 Mich. App. 624 (2004) (statement to
director of Children's Assessment Center not testimonial because addressee was
'not ... a government employee. ')").
61
Fisher notes (p.7) (stating, "If the police already are involved so that the
examination is, in a sense, part of the investigation, then statements to the doctor are
testimonial. Cf Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (holding, prior to Crawford,
that the Confrontation Clause barred admission of victim's statement to doctor
perfonning examination in coordination with police investigation). If, however, the
police are not yet involved, this presents a closer question. But accusatory
statements that are unnecessary for the medical treatment - such as identifying 'who
did this'- are probably still testimonial, especially when laws impose reporting
requirements on doctors. Early decisions on this score have not yet really dealt with
the subtleties of this issue. See State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004)
(holding that statement to doctor identifying perpetrator was not testimonial simply
because 'there was [no] indication of government involvement in the initiation or
course of the examination'); People v. Cage. 15 Cal Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App
2004) (same)").
62
Fisher notes (p. 7) (stating, "A statement to such a person in the course of
allegedly criminal activity is probably not testimonial. See [Crawford,] 124 S. Ct. at
1368 ('[a]nd Bourjaily v.United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987), admitted
statements made unwittingly to an FBI infonnant after applying a more general test
that did not make prior cross-examination an indispensable requirement. '); United
States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (statement to undercover infonnant not
testimonial). But if the government really is trying to produce testimony rather than
capture evidence of ongoing crime, the statements could be testimonial, especially if
governmental involvement becomes a clearer touchstone in future cases for the
testimonial inquiry. In other words, if one can argue that the government is really
trying to circumvent the 'testimonial' rule in order to insulate a witness's narrative
from a confrontation challenge, the declarant's statements may be testimonial even
without the declarant's knowledge that his statement could be used for evidentiary
purposes.)").
63 Fisher notes (p.7) (stating, "'If this exception must be accepted on historical
grounds, it is sui generis.' [Crawford,] 124 S. Ct. [at] 1367 n.6. Dying declarations
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The Crawford Court held that "the constitutional admissibility
of statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used for
evidentiary purposes no longer turns in any way on 'the vagaries of
the rules of evidence, much less [on] amorphous notions of
'reliability."'64 Rather, "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue,
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation."65 Constitutional consideration requiring testimonial
statements to be subject to cross-examination in criminal cases,
"do[es] not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some
broad, modem hearsay exception, even if that exception might be
justifiable in other circumstances."66
"Crawford continues to require that the defendant [have] an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him prior to
trial." 67 "If the defendant was represented by counsel who had an
that obviously are accusations for purpose of future prosecutions might also ... be
viewed as admissible under the forfeiture doctrine, rather than as exception to realm
of testimonial statements .... McDaniel v. State, 16 Miss. 401 (1847) ('It would be a
perversion of [the Constitution's] meaning to exclude the proof, when the prisoner
himself has been the guilty instrument of preventing the production of the witness by
causing his death. '); State v Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004) (same)").
64 Fisher's notes (p. 2) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370); cf Roberts.
65 Fisher's notes (p. 2) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374).
66 Fisher's notes (p. 3) (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n. 7) (citing United
States. v. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F.Supp. 2d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (irrelevant
whether testimonial statement falls within hearsay exception for personal and family
history); State v. Cox, 876 S.2d 932 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (same with regard to coconspirator statements). "The Court's further notation that 'to the extent that a
hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all [in 1791], it required
that the statements be made "immediate[ly]" upon the hurt received, and before [the
declarant] had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advantage,' 124 S. Ct.
at 1367 n. 7, was only by way of saying that to the extent that hearsay rules even
existed as such at the time of the Founding, they respected the confrontation right's
restrictions on testimonial statements. In other words, the scope of hearsay
exceptions in criminal cases in 1791 gives us clues as to how broadly the Framers'
conception of 'testimonial' evidence was." (Fisher notes (p. 3».
67 Fisher notes (p. 8-9) (stating, "If the defendant was represented by counsel who
had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the same or similar
motive for doing so, this satisfies the Confrontation Clause for statements given at
that time. [Cf] Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 (1972) (adequate cross
because statement given at prior trial on same charges); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970) (adequate opportunity where statement was given at
preliminary hearing where defendant was represented by counsel); United States v.
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adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the same or
similar motives for doing so, this satisfies the Confrontation Clause
for statements given at the time."68 Similarly, I/[W]hen the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
places no constraints at all on the use of prior statements[;] ... the
Clause does not bar the admission of a statement so long as the
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it."69
Crawford does not change the law regarding the
"unavailability" of a witness. The burden of proving that a witness is
unavailable lies with the Government and requires a good faith effort
to procure the witness, or, in the alternative, prove unavailability.7o
Unavailability can be occasioned by a witness who is physically
unavailable, such as when a witness has died, or when the

Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443 (5th Cir.2004) (same, although improperly resting
decision on 'firmly rooted' language) with Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08
(1965) (inadequate opportunity when statement given in preliminary hearing where
defendant was not represented by counsel); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 5457 (1899) (inadequate opportunity when statement was given at prior trial where
defendant was not a party and thus had no opportunity to cross-examine); and People
v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) (inadequate opportunity at all preliminary hearings
because state law requires such hearings to be truncated)").
68 Fisher notes (p. 9).
69 Fisher notes (p. 9) (stating, "This is so even if the witness cannot, or claims not to
be able to, remember her prior testimonial statement. United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554 (1988) (no confrontation violation even though head injury impaired
witness's memory after he gave testimonial statement, so cross-examination was of
limited utility); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (same with respect to
witness [who] claimed memory loss at trial); See also People v. Martinez, 810
N.E.2d 199 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (testimonial statement admissible because witness
took the stand); Cooley v. State, 849 A.2d 1026 (Md. App. 2004) (same where
witness recanted on the stand). If, however, the witness is forced to take the stand
but refuses on privilege grounds to answer any questions at all, this does not suffice
to make his prior testimonial statement admissible. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965). Finally, if the defendant fails to ask for a witness he knows is
available to take the stand, he may be found to have had an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination. [Cf] In re Personal Restraint of Suave, 692 P.2d 818 (Wash.
1985) (failing to call witness foreclosed confrontation claim) and State v. Salazar,
796 P.2d 773 (Wash. 1990) (same) with State v. Cox, 876 So.2d 932 (La. Ct. App.
2004) (confrontation rights violated even though trial court offered defendant
0jPortunity to subpoena witness)").
7
Fisher notes (p. 8) (stating, "See e.g. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25
(1969); People v. Miranda WL 1386237, at *7 (Cal. App. June 22, 2004)
(unpublished opinion); Government negligence allowed witness to abscond. See
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1900)").
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Government is unable to locate a witness after making good faith
efforts. Most frequently, a finding that a witness is unavailable is the
result of a valid waiver, such as the Fifth Amendment or marital
privilege. 71 "Perhaps when a witness (usually a young child) is
incompetent to testify, she is unavailable as welL"n Failure by the
Government to produce a witness may also violate the Confrontation
Clause if the Government fails either to make a good faith effort to
produce the witness, or to prove that the witness is legitimately
unavailable. 73
Finally, we tum to the issue of "forfeiture by wrongdoing."
The Crawford Court stated, "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing
(which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially
equitable grounds."74 Although the terms "waiver" and "forfeiture"
are frequently used interchangeably, they are distinct concepts.
"Forfeiture is a penalty against a party who engages in conduct of
which a court disapproves."75 In this context, causing a witness to be
71 Fisher notes (p. 8) (stating, "See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999)
(plurality opinion) (Fifth Amendment) (Assuming Fifth Amendment invocation
establishes unavailability); State v. Crawford, 147 Wn.2d 424 (2002) (marital
privilege)").
72 Fisher notes (p. 8) (stating, "e.g. State v. c.J., 63 P.3d 765, 771 (2003)
(incompetence establishes unavailability); [cf] Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816
(1990) ('assuming without deciding' that incompetence satisfies unavailability
test)").
73 Supra fn. 65.
74 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,150
(1879) (a defendant who "voluntarily keeps the witness away ... cannot insist on his
privilege" of confrontation) (Emphasis added).
75 Valdez and Dahlberg, Tales from the Crypt: An Examination of Forfeiture by
Misconduct and Its Applicability to the Texas Legal System, 31 St. MARY'S L.J. 99,
n.32 (citing Alycia Sykora, Comment, Forfeiture by Misconduct: Proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 75 OR. L. REv. 855, 860-61 (1996)) ("distinguishing
forfeiture from waiver because forfeiture is punishment by wrongdoing, unlike
waiver, which occurs through other forms of defendant conduct."); United States v.
Potamitis, 739 F.2d (2d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d. at
272-73) (stating that a defendant who causes the unavailability of a witness as an
example of giving rise to a waiver of aright.) (explaining that "if [the] witness'
silence is procured by the defendant himself, whether by chicanery, by threats, or by
actual violence or murder, the defendant cannot then assert his confrontation clause
rights in order to prevent [use of] prior grand jury testimony." Although this
behavior has often been referred to as waiver, it is more accurately characterized as
misconduct that results in forfeiture of confrontation rights. See Alycia Sykora,
Comment: Forfeiture By Misconduct: Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
804(b)(6), 75 OR. L. REv. 855, 860-61 (1996). United States v. Bolano, 618 F.2d at
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unavailable through misconduct operates as a forfeiture of both the
right to confrontation and the right to object on hearsay grounds. 76

III.

Confrontation and uForfeiture by Wrongdoing"

Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), titled "forfeiture by wrongdoing,"
creates a hearsay exception permitting the introduction into evidence
of "a statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced
in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness."77
The exception was added to the rules by the 1997 changes:
[T]o provide that a party forfeits the
right to object on hearsay grounds to the
admission of a declarant's prior
statement when the party's deliberate
wrongdoing or acquiescence therein
procured the unavailability of the
629-30 (lOth Cir. 1979) (recounting how a witness who threatened a witness waived
his right of confrontation, resulting in the introduction of the witness's grand jury
testimony into evidence); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1352-53 (8th Cir.
1976) (allowing grand jury testimony into evidence because the defendant threatened
the witness). See also, John R. Kroger, "The Confrontation Waiver Rule, 76 B.u. L.
REV. 835, 846 (1996) (describing the effect of the waiver
of the right of
confrontation);" See Simon & Shuster, Inc. v Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (noting that "no man shall 'take advantage
of his own wrong'''); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 838 n.6
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing the "standing maxim that no man shall be allowed to
make any advantage of his own wrong"). See United States v. White, 116 F. 3d 903,
912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (agreeing with a majority of the courts that misconduct
resulting in the loss of confrontation rights necessarily causes the forfeiture of the
hearsay exception.)).
76 United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1281-82 (1 st Cir. 1996) (holding that the
murder of a witness results in the simultaneous waiver of confrontation rights and a
hearsay objection) (See Tales From The Crypt, 31 ST. MARY'S L. J. 99, n. 130:
"[O]nce the waiver occurs through defendant misconduct, the need for the evidence
grows."). Although the courts refer to this concept as waiver, it is more accurately
described as forfeiture. Because the cases uniformly refer to this concept as waiver,
however, this article will do the same; United States v. Smith, 792 F.2d 441,442 (4th
Cir. 1986) (holding that the defendant waived all hearsay objections by procuring the
witness's absence); See also United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir.
1979).
77 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).
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declarant as a witness. This recognizes
the need for a prophylactic rule to deal
with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes
at the heart of the system of justice
itself'. . . . The wrongdoing need not
consist of a criminal act. The rule
applies to all parties, including the
government. It applies to actions taken
after the event to prevent a witness from
testifying,78
Although only added to Rule 804 as its own "stand-alone"
exception in 1997, Rule 804(b)(6) previously had been widely
recognized by many courts of appeals as a hearsay exception under
the residual hearsay rule, then codified as Rule 804(b)(S),79 The origin
of the Rule can be traced to a 1982 decision from the Second Circuit. 80
In United States v. Mastrangelo, the defendant was charged with
various drug offenses, though only one eyewitness could tie him to
the drug conspiracy. The Government had undercover wiretap
evidence of the defendant threatening the witness and warning him
not to testify against him at the grand jury. During trial, the witness
was murdered on the way to the courthouse to testify. The trial
judge, Chief Judge Jack Weinstein, declared a mistrial and denied the
defendant's motion to preclude his re-prosecution based on the
double jeopardy clause. 8! In denying the motion, Chief Judge
Weinstein expressed his belief that a preponderance of the evidence
showed the defendant was either directly involved or indirectly
acquiesced to the murder of the eyewitness.
At the second trial, presided over by a different district judge,
the Government moved to admit the grand jury testimony of the
murdered eyewitness against the defendant under the residual
78 Commentary to the 1997 changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(Internal
citations omitted).
79 The 1997 changes to the Rules of Evidence deleted separate but identical "residual
hearsay" exceptions in Rule 803 and 804 and codified them as a new Rule, Rule 807,
the text of which was the same as the previous exceptions. Commentary to the 1997
changes to the Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 708, 709 (1997).
80 United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
81 Id. at 272.
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hearsay rule, then codified as Rule 804(b )(5). The defendant objected
on the basis of the hearsay rule and the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause. The trial judge overruled both objections,
finding particularized indicia of trustworthiness sufficient to admit
the grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b )(5). The defendant was
convicted and appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the
case for an additional evidentiary hearing to determine the
involvement, if any, of the defendant in the murder of the eyewitness.
In doing so, however, the court clearly agreed with the district court
that an issue was raised regarding whether the defendant waived his
Sixth Amendment rights and hearsay objection by directly causing or
acquiescing to the witness's murder. It stated:
If [the defendant] was involved in [the
witness's] death, his involvement
waived
his
confrontation
clause
objections to the admission of [the
witness's] testimony. Because a waiver,
if factually supported, will allow us to
avoid resolution of the difficult legal
and constitutional issues arising under
the confrontation clause and Rule
804(b )(5), we remand the case to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing
on the question of [the defendant's]
involvement in the murder of [the
witness] .82

As authority for its holding that a defendant may waive his or
her Confrontation Clause rights by misconduct, the second circuit
cited a series of Supreme Court decisions, as well as a host of circuit
court cases standing for the principle that in either criminal or civil
cases, lithe law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own
wrong."83 The court summed up this point as follows:
82Id.
83 Id.at 272-73 (See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452-53; and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159
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Thus, if a witness' silence is procured by
the defendant himself, whether by
chicanery, by threats, or by actual
violence or murder, the defendant
cannot then assert his confrontation
clause rights in order to prevent prior
grand jury testimony of that witness
from being admitted against him. Any
other result would mock the very
system of justice the confrontation
clause was designed to protect. 84

In addition, the court set forth the procedural requirements
needed to establish the foundation to support a finding of waiver by
wrongdoing. First, an evidentiary hearing is needed in the absence of
the jury to determine the involvement of the party against whom the
statement will be offered in procuring the unavailability of the
declarant. Because the purpose of this hearing is to enable the trial
court to determine, as a preliminary matter, whether a waiver by
wrongdoing has occurred, the hearing is governed by Fed. R. Evid.
l04(a).85 Further, the court held that the party seeking to introduce
the statement of the unavailable declarant bears the burden of proof
to establish the waiver.86 The court noted, however, that there was a
split in authority as to the burden of proof that must be shown to
establish the waiver - preponderance of the evidence (the standard
typically applying to Fed. R. Evid. l04(a) preliminary determinations),
or clear and convincing evidence. 87 The court ultimately concluded:
[w]e see no reason to impose upon the
government more than the usual burden
(1878)).
84 Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73.
85 !d. at 273 (See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), which requires the Court to make
preliminary determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence, the qualifications
of witnesses, and the existence of privileges. In doing so, it need not strictly adhere
to the rules of evidence, except for privilege. See also Rule 1101 (d)( 1)).
86 Mastrangelo, 693 F.3d at 273.
871d. at 274.
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of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence where waiver by misconduct is
concerned. Such a claim of waiver is not
one which is either unusually subject to
deception or disfavored by the law. To
the contrary, such misconduct is
invariably accompanied by tangible
evidence such as the disappearance of
the defendant, disruption in the
courtroom or the murder of a key
witness, and there is hardly any reason
to apply a burden of proof which might
encourage behavior which strikes at the
heart of the system of justice itself.88
The second circuit did caution, however, that despite its
preliminary finding that the proper standard of proof was
preponderance of the evidence, it was prudent for the district court,
on remand, to make its fact-findings under the clear and convincing
standard as well. The court further announced its intention to retain
jurisdiction to address the issue again if raised in a subsequent
appeal. 89 As will be seen, the issue of what standard of proof governs
preliminary hearings to determine whether to apply the waiver by
wrongdoing doctrine continued to be a subject of disagreement
among the federal courts for many years thereafter.
The cases following Mastrangelo acknowledge its importance
in shaping the doctrine of forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights
and hearsay objections by wrongdoing. In understanding this
doctrine, it is important to recognize the narrow foundation on which
it rests. It was not adopted following a comprehensive examination
of the substantive issues associated with either the Confrontation
Clause or the hearsay rule;90 rather, it rests on a single concept - one
whose wrongdoing directly or indirectly procures the unavailability
of the declarant whose statement is offered at trial, by his own
It is, therefore, an
misconduct, waives the right to object.
88Id.
89 Jd.
90Id. at 272.
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unapologetic rule of necessity recognizing that any other outcome
produces a result that is repugnant to a society that values the rule of
law.
The waiver doctrine on which Mastrangelo was premised has
long been accepted in both the United States and Great Britain, which
was the "immediate source" of our own Confrontation Clause
protections. 91
Reynolds v. United States 92 was the first case in which the
Supreme Court recognized that Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause rights could be waived by a party's own misconduct. It
continues to have vitality today, as it was cited with approval by the
majority opinion in Crawford. 93 Reynolds was charged with bigamy
and prosecuted in the territorial courts of the Utah Territory. Prior to
trial, the Government attempted to serve a subpoena on his second
wife, but Reynolds and his first wife prevented the marshal from
serving the subpoena by falsely representing that the second wife was
not present. At trial, the Court allowed the prosecution to offer the
testimony of the second wife against Reynolds in a prior bigamy
charge, over Reynolds's objection. 94 Reynolds was convicted, and
subsequently appealed on a number of grounds, including an alleged
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, analyzing the Confrontation
Clause issue as follows:
The Constitution gives the accused the
right to a trial at which he should be
confronted with the witnesses against
him; but if a witness is absent by his
own wrongful procurement, he cannot
complain if competent evidence is
admitted to supply the place of that
which he has kept away.
The
Constitution does not guarantee an
accused person against the legitimate

Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
93 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370.
94 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 149.
91

92
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consequences of his own wrongful acts.
It grants him the privilege of being
confronted with the witnesses against
him, but if he voluntarily keeps the
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his
privilege. If, therefore, when absent by
his procurement, their evidence is
supplied in some lawful way, he is in no
condition to assert that his constitutional
rights have been violated. 95
As authority for this ruling, the Court cited a series of cases
from Great Britain, most notably Lord Morley's Case,96 in which the
House of Lords discussed the forfeiture of confrontation rights by
misconduct of a defendant, stating:
[I]n case oath should be made that any
witness, who has been examined by the
coroner and was then absent, was
detained by the means or procurement
of the prisoner, and the opinion of the
judges asked whether such examination
might be read, we should answer, that if
their lordships were satisfied by the
evidence they had heard that the
witness was detained by means or
procurement of the prisoner, then the
examination [by the coroner] might be
read; but whether he was detained by
means or procurement of the prisoner
was matter of fact, of which we were not
the judges, but their lordships.97
The Reynolds Court noted that the ruling in Lord Morley's Case
was "recognized as the law in England" following that decision,
Jd. at 158.
Lord Morley's Case, 6 State Trials, 770 (1666).
97 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158 (quoting Lord Morley's Case).
95

96
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citing a series of English precedents that followed the rule in Lord
Morley's Case. 98 The Supreme Court also explained the policy
underlying the rule of forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights by
misconduct as follows:
The Rule has its foundation in the
maxim that no one shall be permitted to
take advantage of his own wrong; and
consequently, if there has not been, in
legal
contemplation,
a
wrong
committed, the way has not been
opened for the introduction of the
testimony [of the unavailable witness].
We are content with this longestablished usage, which, so far as we
have been able to discover, has rarely
been departed from. It is the outgrowth
of a maxim based on the principles of
common honesty, and, if properly
administered, can harm no one.99
Finally, the Court noted that the determination of whether a
party committed misconduct that would waive confrontation rights
was for the trial court to decide as a preliminary matter. tOO In Diaz v.
United States,tOt the Court reaffirmed its ruling in Reynolds, stating,
I/[t]he view that this right [of confrontation of witnesses in a criminal
trial] may be waived also was recognized by this court in Reynolds v.
United States . . . where testimony given on a first trial was held
admissible on a second, even against a timely objection, because the
witness was absent by the wrongful act of the accused."t02 The Court
reiterated this position in Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,t03
98 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158 (citing Lord Morley's Case) (citing Harrison's Case, 12
Id. 851; Regina v. Scaife, 17 Ad. & El. N.S. 242; Drayton v. Wells, I Nott & M.
(S.C.) 409; and Williams v. State o/Georgia, 19 Ga. 403).
99 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.

100
101

Id.

102
103

Id. at 452 (Internal citations omitted).

223 U.S. 442 (1912).
291 U.S. 97,106 (1934).
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by stating I/[n]o doubt [a constitutional privilege] ... may be lost by
consent or at times even by misconduct,"l04 and most recently in
Crawford itself, where the Court stated, importantly:
The Roberts test105 allows a jury to hear
evidence, untested by the adversary
process, based on a mere judicial
determination of reliability. It thus
replaces the constitutionally prescribed
method of assessing reliability with a
wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is
very different from exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause that make no
claim to be a surrogate means of
assessing reliability. For example, the
rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which
we accept) extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds;
it does not purport to be an alternative
means of determining reliability.l06
Thus, the key to understanding the constitutionality of Rule
804(b)(6), as measured by the Confrontation Clause, is to recognize
that it is predicated not on the assumption that the out-of-court
statement of the unavailable declarant is admissible because there is
some underlying indicia of reliability (such as with the other hearsay
exceptions in Rules 803, 804, and 807, which excuse the need to
produce the declarant for in-court testimony, cross examination, and
to be confronted by the defendant), but instead on the equitable
principle of forfeiture, or, less accurately, waiver. This outcome is
viewed as necessary upon a finding that the unavailable witness's
absence was caused by wrongful conduct initiated by, or acquiesced
in, by a party, and done with the intent to render the witness
unavailable. Thus, confrontation rights are not lost absent a showing
of wrongful conduct by the defendant intended to induce a declarant
Id. (citing Diaz v.United States).
The Roberts test was overruled in Crawford.
106 Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. at 1370.
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not to testify, which in fact produces that result. If properly
established, it is difficult to summon much sympathy for the
defendant who complains that introduction of the prior statement of
the unavailable witness is unfair and violative of the Sixth
Amendment.
Every federal circuit court of appeal, and a number of state
courts, has found that, under these circumstances, forfeiture of Sixth
Amendment rights is appropriate. The constitutionality of the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing has been accepted by every
federal circuit court of appeal that has considered it, without
exception, as reflected in the following table:
First Circuit
United States v. Houlihan,
92 F. 3d 1271, 1279
(1st Cir. 1996).

"Though the Confrontation Clause is
a cornerstone of our adversary system
of justice, it is not an absolute . . .
[m]oreover, a defendant may waive
his right to confrontation by knowing
and intentional relinquishment . . .
[w]hile a waiver of right to confront
witnesses typically is express, the law
is settled that a defendant also may
waive it through his intentional
misconduct . . .. By the same token,
courts will not suffer a party to profit
by his own wrongdoing. Thus, a
defendant who wrongfully procures a
witness's absence for the purpose of
denying
the
government
that
witness's testimony waives his right
under the Confrontation Clause to
object to the admission of the absent
witness's
hearsay
statements."
(Internal citations omitted).

Second Circuit
United States v. Aguiar,
975 F.2d 45,47
(2d Cir. 1992).

"A defendant who procures a
witness's absence waives the right of
confrontation for all purposes with
regard to that witness, not just to the
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sworn
hearsay
admission
of
statements. We may assume that the
admission of facially unreliable
hearsay would raise a due process
issue, although it is hard to imagine
circumstances in which such evidence
would survive Fed. R. Evid. 403' s test
of weighing probative value against
prejudicial effect, an objection that is
not waived by procuring a witness's
absence."
Fourth Circuit
United States v. Johnson,
219 F.3d 349, 355
(4th Cir. 2000).

"The district court appears to have
admitted Thomas' hearsay because,
inter alia, Raheem forfeited his hearsay
objections, under Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(6), by having caused the
unavailability of Thomas as a witness
. . . . The district court did not abuse
its discretion in so holding."

Fifth Circuit
United States v. Thevis,
665 F.2d 616, 630
(5th Cir. 1982).

"We conclude that a defendant who
causes a witness to be unavailable for
trial for the purpose of preventing
that witness from testifying also
waives his right to confrontation ....
A defendant who undertakes this
conduct realizes that the witness is no
longer available and cannot be crossexamined. Hence in such a situation
the defendant has intelligently and
knowingly waived his confrontation
rights.
The
policy interests
underlying the confrontation clause,
moreover, mandate this result. We
that
the
right
of
recognize
confrontation is so fundamental to
our concept of a fair trial that it is a
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privilege specifically guaranteed by
the Constitution. Nevertheless ... the
right is not absolute, and must give
way at times to stronger state
when
interests.
Similarly,
confrontation becomes impossible
due to the actions of the very person
who would assert the right, logic
dictates that the right has been
waived.
The law simply cannot
countenance a defendant deriving
benefits from murdering the chief
witness against him. To permit such
subversion of a criminal prosecution
'would be contrary to public policy,
common sense, and the underlying
purpose of the confrontation clause' ..
. and make a mockery of the system of
justice that the right was designed to
protect." (Internal citations omitted).
Sixth Circuit

Steele v. Taylor,
684 F.2d 1193, 1201-03
(6th Cir. 1982).

"From these cases we derive
essentially the same rule as the one
stated by the state trial judge. A prior
statement given by a witness made
unavailable by the wrongful conduct
of a party is admissible against the
party if the statement would have
been admissible had the witness
testified. The rule ... is based on a
public policy protecting the integrity
of the adversary process by deterring
litigants from acting on strong
incentives to prevent the testimony of
an adverse witness. The rule is also
based on a principle of reciprocity
similar to the equitable doctrine of
, clean hands.' The law prefers live
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testimony over hearsay, a preference
designed
to
protect
everyone,
particularly the defendant.
A
defendant cannot prefer the law's
preference and profit from it ... while
repudiating that preference by
creating the condition that prevents
it."
Seventh Circuit
United States v. Scott,
284 F.3d 758, 762
(7th Cir. 2002).

"It is, of course, well-established that
a defendant forfeits his Confrontation
by
wrongfully
Clause
rights
procuring the unavailability of a
witness."

Eighth Circuit
United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346, 1359
(8th Cir. 1977).

liThe law will not place its imprimatur
on the practice of threatening
Government witnesses into not
testifying at trial and courts should
not permit the accused to derive any
direct or tangential benefit from such
conduct . . . [n]or should the law
permit an accused to subvert a
criminal prosecution by causing
witnesses not to testify at trial who
have, at the pretrial stage, disclosed
information which is inculpatory as to
the accused. To permit the defendant
to profit from such conduct would be
contrary to public policy, common
sense and the underlying purpose of
the confrontation clause."

Tenth Circuit
United States v. Balano,
618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th
Cir.1979)(rev'd
on other grounds).

"We agree that, under the common
law principle that one should not
profit by his own wrong, coercion can
constitute voluntary waiver of the
right of confrontation."
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District of Columbia Circuit
United States v. White,
116 F.3d 903, 911
(D.D.C. 1997).

"Even
though
the
right
of
confrontation is both constitutional
and critical to the integrity of the factfinding process ... the defendant may
lose it through misconduct .... It is
hard to imagine a form of misconduct
more extreme than the murder of a
potential witness.
Simple equity
supports a forfeiture principle, as
does a common sense attention to the
need for fit incentives. The defendant
who has removed an adverse witness
is in a weak position to complain
about losing the chance to crossexamine him. And where a defendant
has silenced a witness through the use
of threats, violence or murder,
admission of the victim's prior
statements at least partially offsets the
perpetrator's
rewards
for
his
misconduct. We have no hesitation in
finding, in league with all circuits to
have considered the matter, that a
defendant who wrongfully procures
the absence of a witness or potential
witness may not assert confrontation
rights as to that witness." (Internal
citations omitted).

Although the circuit courts have not always agreed entirely on
how the Rule should be administered,107 not one has expressed any
107 For example, most of the circuit courts, and the drafters of Rule 804(b)(6),
conclude that because the determination whether the defendant actively, or
indirectly, procured by wrongdoing the absence of the witness whose prior statement
is offered under the Rule is a preliminary determination under FED. R. EVID.
104(a), the foundational facts need only be shown by a preponderance of evidence.
See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653-54 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758,
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serious reservations about the need for the Rule. What was absent
prior to Crawford was any direct comment from the United States
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Rule 804(b)(6) following its
codification as a separate hearsay exception in 1997. Crawford
supplied this missing link: "For example, the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on
essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative
means of determining reliability."108
Critics of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule certainly can
argue that Crawford principally addresses a different rule (i.e.
statements of an unavailable declarant against a penal, proprietary, or
pecuniary interest),t09 and therefore, the comments of the majority
constitute mere dicta. This view, however, offers scant support for a
conclusion that there is any serious constitutional infirmity in Rule
804(b)(6), given the breadth of Crawford's examination of the hearsay
rule and Confrontation Clause, as well as its discussion of many
hearsay exceptions other than Rule 804(b)(3).
In addition to the federal courts, at least ten state courts have
adopted the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule:
Arizona

State v. Valencia,
924 P.2d 497,502
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).

"If a defendant silences a witness by
violence or murder, the defendant cannot
then assert his Confrontation Clause
rights in order to prevent the admission

762 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921,926-27 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001); Commentary to the
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 171 F.R.D. 719 ("The usual Rule 104(a)
preponderance of the evidence standard has been adopted in light of the behavior the
new Rule 804(b)(6) seeks to discourage"). One circuit court, however, has ruled that
the foundational facts must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,631 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly, some circuit courts
have required that the court hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to hear
the evidence supporting the introduction of a statement under Rule 804(b)(6).
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he district court must
hold an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury in which the government
has the burden of proving [the foundational facts] by a preponderance of the
evidence"). Other courts have not required a separate evidentiary hearing. United
States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926; United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914-15
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
108 Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (Emphasis added).
109 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
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of prior testimony from that witness . . . .
In such circumstances, a defendant is
deemed to have waived both his
Confrontation Clause and hearsay
objections to the admission of the
witness's statements. . . . Prior to
admitting testimony pursuant to this
principle, the trial court must hold a
hearing at which the government has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant was
responsible for the witness' absence."
(Internal citations omitted).
District of Columbia
Devonshire v.
United
States,
691 A.2d 165, 168
(D.C. 1997).

"We agree with the overwhelming weight
of
authority
that
appellant's
Confrontation Clause rights must fall in
these circumstances. As the trial judge
correctly observed, a defendant's rights
under the Confrontation Clause are not
absolute. A defendant may waive his
right to confrontation by express waiver.
. . or through his own intentional
misconduct . . . . Nor is a defendant
protected when he does away with
witnesses against him.' All federal and
state courts that have addressed this
issue, that we could find, have concluded
that when a defendant procures a
witness's unavailability for trial with the
purpose of preventing the witness from
testifying, the defendant waives his rights
under the Confrontation Clause to object
to the admission of the absent witness'
hearsay statements." (Internal citations
omitted).
I
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Iowa
State v. Hallum,
606 N.W.2d 351,354-56
(Iowa 2000).

"A
waiver
is
an
intentional
relinquishment of a known right . . . . A
forfeiture, on the other hand, is the loss of
a right as a result of misconduct .... As a
review of the case law shows, the focus of
the courts holding that a defendant has
lost his right to object to the admission of
an out-of-court statement falls more
clearly within the common definition of a
forfeiture .... When a court finds that a
defendant has procured a witness's
unavailability, the defendant is precluded
from asserting his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him as a
basis to prevent the admission of prior
statements given by the witness . . . .
Hearsay objections are also forfeited."
(Internal citations omitted).

Kansas
State v. Gettings,
769 P.2d 25, 28
(Kan. 1989).

"The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and § 10 of the Bill of
Rights of the Kansas Constitution provide
criminal defendants with the right to
confront witnesses against them . . . . A
defendant, however, can waive the right
to confrontation. '[W]hen confrontation
becomes impossible due to the actions of
the very person who would assert the
right, logic dictates that the right has been
waived. The law simply cannot
countenance a defendant deriving
benefits from murdering the chief witness
against him.'" (Internal citations omitted).

Louisiana
State v. Magouirk,
539 So. 2d 50, 64-65
(La. Ct. App. 1988).

Adopting as the Law of Louisiana the
rulings in the federal cases, including
Mastrangelo, Thevis and Balano, supra.
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Minnesota

State v. Black,
291 N.W.2d 208,214
(Minn. 1980).

New Jersey

State v. Sheppard,
484 A.2d 1330, 1341-43
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div.1984).

New York

Holtzman v. Hellenbrand,
460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595-98
(App. N.Y. Div. 1983).
Pennsylvania and
Tennessee
Penn. R. Evid. 804(b)(6)
and Tenn. R. Evid.
804(b)(6).

liThe law is clear that if a witness is
unavailable because of the wrongdoing of
the defendant, the defendant cannot
complain if other competent evidence is
introduced to take the place of the
witness' testimony." (Internal citations
omitted).
Adopting the position taken by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds, and the
forfeiture by wrongdoing rule articulated
in other federal cases.

Adopting the forfeiture by wrongdoing
rule articulated in Mastrangelo, Balano,
Thevis, and other federal cases.

Adopting the forfeiture by wrongdoing
rule articulated by Reynolds, Snyder, Diaz
and Mastrangelo.

The Maryland Rules do not contain an equivalent to Rule
804(b)(6). During the 2004 legislative session, however, the Office of
the Governor introduced bills in the House of Delegates and the
Senate to add such a rule. Senate Bill 185 and House Bill 296
proposed to add to the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, section
10-901, the following:
(A) A statement is not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the statement is offered
against a party that has engaged or
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to and did procure the
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unavailability of the Witness as defined
in Maryland Rule 5-804 who was the
declarant of the statement.
(B) The court shall determine the
admissibility of a statement under this
section in the manner provided in the
Maryland Rules.
Proposed section 1O-901(a) is substantially identical to Fed. R.
Evid. 804(b)(6). The provision in 10-901(b) of the proposed Rule
directs that, in determining whether to admit statements under the
Rule, the trial court is governed by the Maryland Rules. The effect of
this provision would be to incorporate by reference Rule 5-104(a) of
the Maryland Rules, which governs preliminary evidentiary
determinations and applies a preponderance of the evidence
standard.I 1o Neither bill passed, and the effort to adopt the Rule
failed.
Given the likelihood that the Rule again will be proposed in
future legislative sessions, or, alternatively, that it will be proposed
for consideration to the Rules Committee of the Maryland Courts for
incorporation into the Maryland Rules, it is appropriate to consider
whether Maryland should have the Rule. With respect to the
constitutionality of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule, the case law
discussed above, particularly the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford, disposes of any credible Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause argument against the Rule. It cannot be argued seriously that
there is any independent basis for opposing the Rule under the
Confrontation Clause provisions of Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, given that the origin of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing rule comes from the English Common law, and the
Maryland Declaration of Rights is in pari materia with the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause. 111
If it is accepted that there is no viable Confrontation Clause
challenge to adopting a forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
L. McLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE (1994), § 2.104.4, at p. 69.
See, e.g. Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547,636 A. 2d 463 (1994); Craig v. State,
322 Md. 418,588 A. 2d 328 (1991); and Tyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495, 660 A. 2d
110

III

986 (1995).
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hearsay rule, the only remaining question to address is whether there
is a need for it. While there is no useful empirical evidence to answer
this question, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence
demonstrating a compelling need for adopting the forfeiture by
wrongdoing rule in Maryland.l 12
112 See, e.g. Protecting Witnesses, Editorial, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 14, 2004,
2004 WL 84123923 (Discussing witness intimidation in Baltimore City and Prince
George's County. Reporting that in May, 2004 Baltimore City prosecutors dropped
13 of 52 shooting cases because of witness problems); Gail Gibson, Drug Trial

Witness Helps Efforts to Convict Ex-Friends: u.s. Prosecutors Say Men Were
Members of Gang, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 6, 2004 at Local IB (Recounting

evidence of witness intimidation in drug prosecution in federal court in Baltimore
City); Conspiracy of Silence, Editorial, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 16,2004 at 18A
(Stating that in the past year Baltimore City prosecutors relocated 95 witnesses for
their protection, dismissed 90 non-fatal shootings because of witness problems,
primarily witness intimidation); Gail Gibson, Survivor Tells Jury of Attack that Left
Two Friends Dead, Federal Death-Penalty Trial Focuses on Drug Activity, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 12, 2004 at Local 2B (Describing killing of key witness in
federal drug prosecution in Baltimore City); Allison Klein, Ehrlich Targets Witness

Threats Under Bill, Intimidation or Harm Would Carry Increased Penalties:
Measure Could Allow Hearsay Opponents Include Defense Attorneys, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 9, 2004 at Local IB (Reporting comments of a Baltimore
City homicide prosecutor that in 90 percent of his cases, witnesses are afraid to
testify; commenting on 2002 arson death of Baltimore family as act of retaliation;
and describing other cases where witness intimidation hampered or prevented
prosecution of criminal cases); Neely Tucker, Girl's Slaying Opens Window on
Intimidation, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2004 at AOl (Reporting efforts to
address witness intimidation in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia;
reporting opinions of District of Columbia Superior Court judge and Prince George's
County Circuit Court judge that witness intimidation is a frequent event; reporting
estimate of the U.S. Attorney that in last decade, drug gangs have killed more than
two dozen informants or witnesses in the District of Columbia); Robert Redding, Jr.,
Annapolis Mayor Wants Assembly to Protect Witnesses, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
Dec. l, 2003 (Reporting efforts of Annapolis mayor to introduce legislation before
the Maryland General Assembly to offer protections against witness intimidation;
reporting that witness problems in Baltimore City prevented 60 percent of city's
criminal cases); Allison Klein, Spain Gets 25 Years in Shooting: W. Baltimore Boy,

10, Hit with Stray Bullet on Stoop in July 2002; Judge Calls Crime 'Vicious '; Case
Heard in Two Trials; Key Witness Also Killed, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 24, 2003
at Local lB (Reporting "catastrophic loss" to prosecution case caused by killing of
key witness); Kimberly A.C. Wilson, Suspect in Shooting is Killed Days After
Charge Is Dropped, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 26, 2003 at Local 8B (Reporting
comments of representative of city prosecutor's office regarding killing of
prosecution witness, describing an "escalating pattern"); Caitlin Francke, Changing

Stories Tangle City Courts: Recanting Witnesses Frequently Switch Statements
When They Get on the Stand, Frustrating Judges and Prosecutors, THE BALTIMORE
SUN, Nov. 20, 2000 at Telegraph lA (Reporting that prosecutor's and judges in
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The problem does not seem to be restricted to Maryland and
Washington D.C. Commentators have noted the increasing problem
of witness intimidation throughout the country:
[A] Department of Justice Study found
evidence that there had indeed been an
increase in witness intimidation in the
late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s.
A number of prosecutors linked this
increase in violent victim and witness
intimidation to the advent of gangcontrolled crack sales in the mid to late
1980s. Several prosecutors estimated
that victim and witness intimidation is
suspected in up to 75-100 percent of the
violent crimes committed in some gangdominated neighborhoods. A National
Institute of Justice assessment found
that "51 percent of prosecutors in large
jurisdictions and 43 percent in small
jurisdictions said that intimidation of
victim and witnesses was a major
problem" .... An additional 30 percent
of prosecutors in large jurisdictions and
"25 percent in small jurisdictions labeled
intimidation a moderate problem."ll3

Those who oppose the adoption of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule often raise objections other
than constitutional challenges. They talk about the danger of criminal
convictions based upon false testimony of witnesses who make
incriminating pretrial statements to police, or in grand jury testimony,
Baltimore City say that witness recantations seriously hamper criminal prosecution,
estimating that witnesses change stories in approximately 50 percent of cases).
113
Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing-Old Wine in a New Bottle-Solving the Mystery of the Codification of
the Concept into Federal Rule 804(b06), 80 NEB. L. REv. 891,904-05.
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but who do not testify at trial where they may be cross-examined and
must confront the defendant against whom they testify.114 Candor
requires an acknowledgment that adoption of a forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule does pose some risk of
admitting unreliable testimony. The existing rules of evidence,
however, offer abundant safeguards to address this risk. Proper
administration of the Rule by trial judges, with overSight by the
appellate courts, would reduce any realistic degree of risk such that,
when compared to the societal harm posed by not having the Rule,
the risk is substantially outweighed.
First, if the Rule proposed by the Governor, which is in
substance Fed. R. Evid. B04(b)(6), is adopted, it would require
prosecutors to lay a proper foundation before the statement of the
unavailable witness may be admitted. The State would be required to
show: (1) that the witness was unavailable to testify because of any of
the reasons stated in Md. Rule 5-B04(a);115 (2) that the party against
whom the statement would be offered at trial (typically the criminal
defendant) either personally acted, or acquiesced in, the action of
others; (3) that the action was wrongful; (4) that the action was
intended to procure the unavailability of the witness; and (5) that the
action actually did procure the unavailability of the witness.
The trial court has discretion, under Md. Rule 5-104(a), not to
relax application of the rules of evidence and to require the prosecutor

Allison Klein, Ehrlich Targets Witness Threats Under Bill: Intimidation or Harm
Would Carry Increased Penalties; Measure Could Allow Hearsay Opponents
Include Defense Attorneys, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 9, 2004 at Local 1B
(Reporting the opposition to the legislation proposed to adopt the forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay clause of Baltimore criminal defense attorney).
liS Rule 5-804(a) identifies five circumstances in which a witness is deemed
unavailable: if exempted from testifying by asserting a privilege; by refusing to
testify despite a court order to do so; if the witness testifies to a lack of memory
about the subject of the testimony; if the witness may not testify because of death,
infirmity or physical or mental illness; and if the witness is beyond the power of the
court to compel his or her presence at trial. Importantly, the rule also states "[a]
statement will not qualify under section (b) of this Rule if the unavailability is due to
the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying." Thus, if there is evidence that
the prosecution or law enforcement authorities have engaged in any wrongdoing to
induce the declarant to be unavailable, the absent witness's statement would not be
admissible.
114
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to make this showing through facts that are admissible under the
rules of evidence. Furthermore, Md. Rule 5-104(c) permits the trial
judge to require that the prosecutor lay the foundation for the
statement out of the presence of the jury, so it cannot be prejudiced if
the court rules that the statement is not admissible. Even after the
prosecutor has made the preliminary showing required by the Rule,
the trial judge may still examine the content of the statement to be
offered and exclude it if it otherwise would be inadmissible, even if
the witness was present to testify. Thus, if the absent witness's
statement contains inadmissible speculation or opinion, it may be
excluded under Md. Rules 5-701 or 5-702. If it appears that the
witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts contained in the
statement, it may be excluded under Md. Rule 5-602. The credibility
of the witness could be attacked if (1) he had a qualifying prior
criminal conviction affecting his truthfulness; (2) he is biased against
the defendant; (3) he has a poor reputation for truthfulness; (4) there
is some defect in the ability of the witness to perceive, remember and
relate facts; or (5) the witness has given an inconsistent version of the
facts, all of which are impeaching facts that may be brought out by the
defendant under Md. Rule 5-806. Additionally, if the trial court
determines that the probative value of the witness's statement is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant, the statement may be excluded under Md. Rule 5-403.
Finally, if the trial judge admits the statement over the defendant's
objection and the defendant is convicted and appeals, the appellate
courts can review the trial judge's ruling for error.
These procedural protections, combined with the preliminary
foundation that must be shown by the prosecutor, provide powerful
protections against convictions based on unreliable evidence.
Moreover, it must be remembered that, in the federal system, the rule
of forfeiture by wrongdoing has been in widespread use for more
than twenty years. There has been no credible showing that its use
has resulted in unfair convictions.
In the end, the question of whether to adopt the forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule requires the making of a
choic~ between possible harmful outcomes. On one hand, there is
overwhelming anecdotal evidence that witness intimidation is
widespread in Maryland, and that this problem is imposing a serious
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burden on prosecutors in obtaining convictions in very serious cases.
Defendants have literally been able to get away with murder by
killing or intimidating the witnesses who could prove their guilt. On
the other hand, there is the theoretical possibility that,
notwithstanding the procedural and substantive safeguards built into
the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule and the rules of evidence in
general, there may be instances of convictions based, in part, on
unreliable witness statements. The evidence of the harm done by not
having the Rule is voluminous and immediate. The evidence of harm
in adopting the Rule is conjectural and unsupported by more than
twenty years of experience in the federal system. On balance, the
time is long overdue to adopt this Rule.
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